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A report from Holland} 
where lithe most sig-
nificant arbitration 
body in history}} has 
devoted 16 years to 
mediating legal 
matters between two 
hostile nations: the 
United States and the 
Republic of Iran. 
Recent diplomatic overtures made 
to the United States by Iran's presi-
dent Mohammed Khatami were 
front-page news, but when I tel1 peo-
ple, even right here in The Hague, 
that I'm a legal advisor at the Iran-
United States Claims 'Itibunal, 
most ofthem reply that 
they've heard about "the war 
crimes courts or the court at 
the Peace Palace." I explain that, 
no, the Claims 'Itibunal isn't the 
International Court of Justice, 
or the International Criminal 
'Itibunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia. Rather, it's an international 
arbitral tribunal established in 1981 
as part of the settlement to free the 
52 Americans taken hostage in Iran 
in 1979. 
It's not surprising that many people 
have never heard of the Claims 
'Itibunal. It carries on its proceed-
ings in relative obscurity, in an 
1"3 inconspicuous former hotel in 
this sleepy, diplomat-heavy 
~4 Dutch city. But though its phys-
ical surroundings are modest, 
"II its success isn't: the 'Itibunal 
has been described as "the most 
significant arbitral body in history," 
and for 16 years it has brought togeth-
er lawyers and judges from two de-
cidedly hostile nations to discuss 
complex legal questions in an excep-
tionally delicate political context. 
The 'Itibunal has managed to sidestep 
hundreds oflegal and political prob-
lems to stay on course, resolve claim 
after claim, and have, I believe, a sig-
nificant effect on the development of 
public international law. 
Nearly two decades after the 
hostage crisis, it may be hard to re-
member that for 30 years before the 
Spring 1998 
17 
1979 incident, Iran and America 
were the closest of al1ies. During 
those years, Iran experienced enor-
mous economic and military growth, 
spurred by increased oil revenues, 
and the Shah, wishing to industrialize 
Iran's growing economy, turned to 
Western - especial1y American -
technology, equipment, advisors, and 
investment. American companies 
and the American military were 
more than happy to provide such 
help, and by the late 1970s, Iran was 
home to many American business in-
terests, ranging from constrnction 
projects to off-shore oil drilling to 
product lines like Pepsi-Cola and 
Revlon. The American government, 
seeking to obtain a secure foothold in 
the Persian Gulf, also supplied Iran 
with vast quantities of military hard-
ware. By the late 1970s, hundreds of 
American corporations were in-
volved in lucrative Iranian projects, 
and tens of thousands of American 
citizens were living in Iran. 
But during that same period, anti-
Western sentiment began to gain 
force in Iran. Although the Shah had 
promised for many years to lift his 
people from poverty, his promises 
were largely unfulfilled, and substan-
tial segments ofthe population had 
difficulty meeting basic needs. While 
poor Iranian families, three genera-
tions strong, crowded into miserable, 
dilapidated apartments in South 
Thhran, Americans and wealthy 
Iranians lived luxuriously in the tree-
shaded foothills of North Thhran. 
Many Iranians not only believed the 
Westerners to be exploiting their 
country's economic resources, but 
they also thought the Americans and 
their col1eagues were, without much 
thought or sensitivity, imposing West-
ern values and culture on Iran. 
These were the seeds of a revolu-
tion, and it began in 1978, with vio-
lent strikes and demonstrations 
against the government. By late 
December 1978, most American busi-
nesses in Iran were so disrnpted tl1at 
they felt compel1ed to suspend activi-
ties and to bring expatriates home. lj 
The Shah fled the countly in January ~ 
1979, the Ayatol1ah Khomeini took -< 
power in Febrnary, and soon after ~ 
the new Islamic Republic ofIran ,. 
began instituting its reforms. The tQ 
new government wasted no time in ~ 
breaching contracts with American ~ 
companies and in expropriating com- g: 
panies, especially those owned by 
American investors or Westernized 
Iranians perceived to be allies of the 
Shah. The government also formally 
nationalized certain industries, in-
cluding banking and insurance, and 
de facto nationalized the petroleum 
industry. 
On Nov:ember 4, 1979, the United 
States Embassy was seized and 52 
Americans held hostage. Readers old 
enough to remember the hostage cri-
sis will remember the seeming hope-
lessness of resolution, as Iran seized 
its chance to defy "the Great Satan," 
the United States, on a world stage. 
Frustrated, President Jimmy Carter 
ordered an ill-fated military rescue at-
tempt. On the night of April 24, 1980, 
eight Sea Stallion RH-53D helicopters 
lifted off from the aircraft carrier 
Nimitz. They were supposed to fly to 
a remote landing strip 275 miles from 
Tehran; rendezvous with six C-130 
Hercules transport planes carrying 
commandos, vans, and trucks; and 
then storm the American Embassy 
and rescue the hostages. But the heli-
copters met with a sandstorm that 
disabled two ofthem. One then 
crashed into one ofthe C-130s. Both 
aircraft burst into flames, eight 
servicemen died, the hostages re-
mained hostage, and American hopes 
plummeted. 
Yet Carter had, all this time, a qui-
eter weapon, one that would eventu-
ally prove to be the key to resolving 
the crisis. When the American Em-
bassy was seized in 1979, Carter im-
mediately froze Iranian assets in the 
United States and in American finan-
cial institutions abroad - assets to-
talling $12 billion. That money was of 
great interest, of course, to the Amer-
ican companies that had lost property 
or had contracts breached by the new 
Iranian government, and the Ameri-
can companies filed suit in American 
courts, seeking recompense for their 
losses. Many ofthe claims proceeded 
to judgment, and Iranian assets to 
pay these judgments were judicially 
attached. 
So, by the autumn ofl980, when 
Iran and the United States began to 
negotiate in earnest to resolve the 
hostage crisis, it was clear that each 
side had something the other wanted. 
The United States wanted its hostages 
released, and wanted them freed 
without having to pay ransom for 
them. Iran wanted its money back, 
and wanted to get out from under 
what it viewed as burdensome litiga-
tion before American judges. The 
United States, howeveI; could not 
simply return Iran's money upon the 
release ofthe hostages; much of the 
money had been judicially attached, 
and simply returning the money 
would have been perceived in Ameri-
ca as selling out American litigants. 
The solution: the establishment of 
the Iran-United States Claims TI:i-
buna1. Representatives ofIran and 
the United States never met face-to-
face, but they conducted intense 
negotiations through Algerian inter-
mediaries during the last months of 
1980. On January 19,1981, the coun-
tries agreed to the 'l\lgiers Declara-
tions," which stated that the hostages 
would be released, most ofIran's as-
sets would be returned to Iran, and 
an international arbitral tribunal 
would be established in The Hague to 
adjudicate, among other things, the 
claims of American litigants against 
Iran. It should be noted that not all of 
Iran's assets were returned; the 
Declarations required that $1 billion 
be transferred to a security account 
that would be used to pay the awards 
that the TI:ibunal issued against Iran. 
The declarations also required Iran to 
replenish the account when it dipped 
below $500,000. The Declarations 
provided that the TI:ibunal would be 
composed of nine arbitrators: three 
appointed by the United States, three 
appointed by Iran, and three appoint-
ed by both countries together, or by 
an appointing authority ifthe coun-
tries could not agree. Litigation in the 
United States was suspended, and 
American litigants were told to bring 
their claims before the 'Ihbuna1. 
The return ofthe American 
hostages led to great euphoria in the 
United States, but the American liti-
gants who had brought suit against 
Iran in American courts were not as 
delighted; they would have to travel 
to The Hague to adjudicate their 
claims before an untested arbitral 
body applying who-knew-what law. 
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Not surprisingly, some American liti-
gants sued the United States govern-
ment, alleging, among other things, 
that by requiring them to cease litiga-
tion in American courts and to bring 
their claims before the TI:ibunal, the 
government had effected an uncon-
stitutional taking of their property. 
This bid was rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which recognized 
precedents upholding the President's 
authority to settle claims of United 
States nationals, and which was no 
doubt aware ofthe difficult position 
in which the President had been 
placed. 
So the TI:ibunal began. Litigants 
had a year to file their claims, and 
3,816 claims were filed before the 
deadline. Howevel; this rush of activ-
ity from the claimants went un-
matched by the TI:ibunal itself. 
The American litigants and arbitra-
tors early and often charged Iran 
with egregious stalling. Iran routinely 
requested extensions oftime for fil-
ing its briefs, extensions that were 
routinely granted. One American ar-
bitrator, Judge Brower, acidly com-
plained that the TI:ibunal had "been 
moving at a speed calculated to in-
spire professional envy in sloth and 
snail alike." Further, the Americans 
suspected from the outset that the 
Iranian arbitrators were appointed 
simply to rule for Iran, and it was 
commonly thought that Iranian arbi-
trators deliberately delayed proceed-
ings by making themselves unavail-
able for deliberations (one Iranian ar-
bitrator, for example, vanished on a 
sudden five-week vacation at a key 
moment), and refusing to sign cer-
tain awards made by the TI:ibuna1. 
The Iranians, on the other hand, 
were convinced that the TI:ibunal was 
too "Western" to be fair, and they sus-
pected that the six non-Iranian arbi-
trators were biased against Iran. They 
were already opposed to a Swedish 
arbitrator, Judge Mangard, who had 
allegedly condemned executions 
(thereby "prejudging Iran's political 
system," according to the Iranians), 
and their overall frustration turned to 
fury in 1984 when the 1hbunal ruled 
that Iranians who had left the coun-
try and obtained American citizen-
ship could apply to the 1hbunal for 
redress. In the wake ofthat ruling, 
Iran's Prime Minister at the time, Mr. 
Musavi, accused the 1tibunal of suc-
cumbing to pressure from "the Great 
Satan, America," and threatened boy-
cotts of sessions. The Iranian arbitra-
tors categorized the llibunal's awards 
as a "manifestation of the work of a 
degenerated system," and charged 
further that "the llibunal, with its 
predominantly Western composition, 
has in every respect betrayed the 
trust vested in it." Finally, on Septem-
ber 3,1984, as the Swedish judge, 
Mangard, was walking toward a meet-
ing room, two Iranian arbitrators 
Judges Kashani and Shafeiei - physi-
cally attacked him, punching him, 
yanking on his tie, and shoving him 
out the front door ofthe 1tibunal. 
That disturbance was quelled, but 
Kashani said that if "Mangard ever 
dares to enter the 1tibunal chamber 
again, either his corpse or my corpse 
will leave it rolling down the stairs," 
and Mangard, urged to stay home by 
his colleagues, did, and so was placed 
under virtual house arrest. 
Not surprisingly, proceedings at 
the llibunal came to a virtual stand-
still, and many wondered ifthis inno-
vative experiment in cross-cultural 
justice had come to an end. Indeed, 
Judge Shafeiei later said that he and 
Judge Kashani had planned the at-
tack on Judge Mangard in the hopes 
of putting pressure on the Iranian 
Government to withdraw from the 
1tibunal. But Iran apparently decided 
that it had too much at stake in the 
1tibunal to abandon it, and the 1ti-
bunal persevered. Iran decided of its 
own accord to replace the offending 
arbitrators, and the 1tibunal resumed 
its work. Although the attack on 
Judge Mangard brought the TIibunal 
to the brink of collapse, it was also a 
turning point. The 1tibunal that re-
sumed work was a stronger, more 
confident institution, no longer afraid 
that Iran would withdraw from the 
agreement, and both nations re-
newed their commitment to make 
the institution work. 
Since then the 1tibunal has carried 
on, largely out ofthe public eye, 
slowly resolving the claims brought 
before it. I do not suggest that all of 
the llibunal's problems have disap-
peared. Proceedings sometimes 
move at what Americans at home 
would consider a sick snail's pace, 
briefings in cases routinely drag on 
for three or more years, and the 
preparation of a written opinion, 
once a hearing has finally been held, 
can take another two years, as the is-
sues are hashed out by the arbitrators 
again and again, and opinions revised 
ad infinitum. Indeed, the 1tibunal has 
still not held hearings in a handful of 
cases that were filed before the Janu-
ary 19,1982 deadline. And the 1ti-
bunal shares with all judicial systems 
the plague of claimants who are will-
ing to perjure themselves for gain. 
The Government ofIran has often 
maintained that the security account 
beckons to thieves as if it were a pot 
of gold, and that characterization has 
at times seemed apt. In one case, for 
example, an American named 
Gordon Williams filed suit at the lli-
bunal, claiming that certain govern-
ment-controlled Iranian banks had 
failed to honor two letters of credit 
that had been opened in favor of his 
company. The 1tibunal concluded 
that Williams was entitled to 
$300,000, plus interest from 1980. 
The Algerian Central Bank, as escrow 
agent, forwarded the money to the 
Federal Reserve Bank in New York to 
be paid to Ml: Williams. At that point 
the Fed discovered that there were 
competing Gordon Williamses, 
conspirators who turned out to be 
Iranian nationals using the birth cer-
tificate of a deceased American. 
But despite some delay and chi-
canery, the 1tibunal is a stunning 
and surprising success: It has decided 
more than 3,900 cases in 16 years 
and awarded nearly $3 billion to U.S. 
claimants. And from ajurispruden-
tial standpoint, the 1tibunal is the 
largest and most important arbitral 
institution ever instituted in interna-
tional relations, and its decisions 
"constitute perhaps the greatest sin-
gle source of jurisprudential develop-
ment of public international law in 
history," according to former Ameri-
can arbitrator Charles Browser. 
The 1tibunal is influential primarily 
for two reasons: first, its decisions are 
public, which is unprecedented in in-
ternational arbitration; and second, 
its decisions cover an enormous 
range ofinternational business trans-
actions, and so serve as precedent on 
a wide variety of subjects. The 1ti-
bunal's most notable jurisprudential 
contribution is in the law of expropri-
ation, but it also has rendered signifi-
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cant decisions in treaty interpreta-
tion and the nationality of claims, 
among other areas. 
Why has the 1tibunal been success-
ful? 
One, it has persisted; clearly both 
countries have continued to partici-
pate in (and fund!) the 1tibunal be-
cause they believe it to be in their 
best interest to do so. American 
claimants have clearly benefited, and 
Iran has brought suit seeking billions 
of dollars for alleged breaches of con-
tract for military equipment. 
TWo, it has carefully combined 
principle and pragmatism. It has not 
allowed itself to be cowed by threats 
or obstructionistic behavior, but it 
also has handled matters flexibly and 
diplomatically. The 1tibunal has 
often gone out of its way to avoid call-
ing attention to obvious misbehavior 
or to avoid deciding politically explo-
sive issues. This can be frustrating, 
especially to Americans who believe 
in "tellin' it like it is," but such for-
bearance has paid great dividends. 
Finally, the 1tibunal provides 
direct access between two govern-
ments that have no formal diplomatic 
relations. This ability to communi-
cate informally is of great value. It 
was especially useful recently when 
Washington and Thhran negotiated a 
$61.8 million settlement for Iran's 
claim against the United States over 
the 1988 "Airbus incident." The U.S.S. 
Vincennes shot down an Iran Air A-
300 Airbus over the Persian Gulfthat 
year, and Iran's claim against the 
United States as a result of the inci-
dent had been before the high-
visibility International Court of Jus-
tice for years. Fortunately for all, the 
parties were able to settle the matter 
quietly and relatively quickly in the 
1tibunal. 
So, while presidents elsewhere 
trade statements, here in an incon-
spicuous former hotel, without the 
grandeur of the Peace Palace, without 
the heavy international press cover-
age afforded the War Crimes TIi-
bunal, the Iran-United States Claims 
TI-ibunal proceeds with its cases. Al-
though it is sometimes inefficient 
and sometimes motivated as much 
by politics as by law, it is notable as a 
place where words, not bullets and 
bombs, continue to be exchanged be-
tween hostile nations. Flaws and all, 
the 1tibunal is something eminently 
worth talking about. 0 
Nancy Amoury Combs '91 has served 
as a law clerk for U. S. Supreme Court 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, and con-
cludes her tenn with the 'Dibunal in 
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